Dharma Drum Journal of Buddhist Studies

       This paper addresses two interrelated issues in Dharmapāla’s commentary on the Ālambanaparīkṣā: (1) how to understand the fallacy of unestablished reason (asiddha-hetu) pointed out by Dharmapāla; (2) how to interpret the difficult key paragraph in which the term “fa-cheng” is mentioned, and which is closely related to the former issue. On the basis of LÜ Cheng’s punctuation with the addition of words and reconstruction of Buddhist syllogisms, this paper elaborates on the preliminary context, interprets the whole key paragraph, and presents the Buddhist logical argument, adding up to a tentative version of interpretation or a working hypothesis. According to the working hypothesis, (1) the fallacy of unestablished reason pointed out by Dharmapāla is in response to the reason “because of being consistent with the characteristic of the cognitive object (ālambana)” put forward by both the first adversary, whose thesis is that atoms are cognitive objects, and the second adversary, whose thesis is that agglomerates of atoms are cognitive objects. However, the fallacy of inconclusive reason (anaikāntika-hetu) pointed out by Dharmapāla is in response to either the first adversary’s reason “because of being the cause of the [cognitions]” or the second adversary’s reason “because a cognition arises with its appearance;” (2) the term “fa-cheng” does not refer to Dharmakīrti, but “fa” (dharma) means pakṣadharma, i.e., a property of the subject. This paper also examines alternative readings and points out their problems or defects. In comparison with the alternatives, the working hypothesis has explanatory advantages, although it might not have resolved all the doubts. In any case, any unsolved problem or errors are due to the author alone; if there is any positive contribution, it should be attributed to LÜ Cheng, whose achievements deserve more respect and attention.

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