

The Reception of Vaiśeṣika Philosophy in East  
Asia: A Study of Kōgen Jōtai's (光嚴乘體,  
1740-1807) *Shōshūjikkugironshaku Bōkanroku*  
(勝宗十句義論釋傍觀錄)

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## Abstract

This paper explores the reception of Vaiśeṣika (勝論) philosophy in East Asia, with a primary focus on Kōgen Jōtai's hitherto unexamined sub-commentary on Vaiśeṣika, *Shōshūjikkugironshaku Bōkanroku* (勝宗十句義論釋傍觀錄). This sub-commentary offers a discerning yet highly critical interpretation of Kiben Daidōbō's (1718-1791, 基辨大同房) commentary, *Shōshūkikkugironshaku* (勝宗十句義論釋), on *Daśapadārthī* (勝宗十句義論), a seminal text of Vaiśeṣika philosophy in East Asia. Kōgen Jōtai's commentary is organized around 37 distinct issues, all of which stem from Kiben's contentious interpretations of Vaiśeṣika. The paper analyzes and describes each issue. These issues span a variety of philosophical concepts, ranging from ontology and perception to the interpretation of technical Vaiśeṣika vocabulary, as well as errors such as misquotations, omissions, or confluences of Vaiśeṣika terminology.

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## Keywords

Vaiśeṣika, Daśapadārthī, Kōgen Jōtai, Kiben Daidōbō, Edo period

# 1. Introduction

This article aims to investigate Kōgen Jōtai's (光嚴乗体, 1740-1807) sub-commentary, *Shōshūjikkugironshaku Bōkanroku* (勝宗十句義論釋傍觀錄), on Kiben Daidōbō's (1718-1791, 基辨大同房) commentary *Shōshūkikkugironshaku* (勝宗十句義論釋) on the Vaiśeṣika (勝論) text *Daśapadārthī* (勝宗十句義論, T. 2138) by providing a description and philosophical analysis of the sub-commentary. This work is the first to examine Kōgen's sub-commentary and one of the first attempts<sup>1</sup> to thoroughly characterize any Edo-period commentary on *Daśapadārthī*. Before delving into the main subject matter, a brief introduction to the topic is provided in the second section. In the third section, the structure and content of the root text *Daśapadārthī* is discussed, along with Kiben Daidōbō's commentary on the text and Kōgen's commentary on the latter. The fourth and final section focuses on the philosophical topics appearing in Kōgen's sub-commentary, drawing attention to how Vaiśeṣika concepts are treated in Kiben's and Kōgen's understanding, and where applicable, in comparison to classical Indian Vaiśeṣika authors.

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<sup>1</sup> The article by T. Snūviškis provides an overview of the existing literature on Edo commentaries, briefly describing and contextualizing these commentaries (Snūviškis 12, 43-56). In the same year as the publication of the aforementioned article, Professor Hé Huānhuān (何歡歡) produced a critical edition of Kiben's commentary on *Daśapadārthī*, accompanied by a thorough and informative introduction (Kiben 2021, unpublished).

## 2. Indian Vaiśeṣika and The Three Stages of Reception of Vaiśeṣika in East Asia

Vaiśeṣika is an Indian philosophical school renowned for its theory of categories (*padārthas*), offering a detailed explanation of the universe. Its earliest text, the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, is among the oldest Brahmanical sūtra compositions. From the third century BCE to the eleventh century CE, Vaiśeṣika was influential in India, actively debating other schools, especially Buddhism. These interactions led to other philosophies like Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta incorporating many Vaiśeṣika's insights. A popular saying from the time, “the knowledge of the systems of Kaṇāda (Vaiśeṣika) and Paninian grammar is beneficial to all other theories” (*kāṇādaṃ pāṇinīyaṃ ca sarvaśāstropakāraṅgam*), highlighted the importance of Vaiśeṣika in India. However, by the eleventh century, Vaiśeṣika lost its distinct status and was largely integrated into the Nyāya tradition.

While primarily documented through Indian sources, Vaiśeṣika also had a presence beyond India, notably in East Asia. In East Asia, Vaiśeṣika was significantly interpreted, though comprehensive studies on its influence in the region remain scarce. Scholars such as Anantalal Thakur, Karuneshu Shukla, Hōjō Kenzō, and Ionut Moise have attempted to map out the diversity of Vaiśeṣika traditions, recognizing different textual preferences and doctrinal variations (Shukla 1970; Hōjō 1994; Moise 39-40). Thakur identified three textual traditions (Moise 39): the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* with its commentaries, *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* with its commentaries, and other

related works like *Lakṣaṇāvalī*. Conversely, Hōjō proposed two main traditions: *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* and *Daśapadārthi*, and he was among the first to recognize the importance of *Daśapadārthi*'s interpretation efforts in East Asia. However, in my assessment, while these contributions are praiseworthy, they have not yet captured the intricacies of Vaiśeṣika in East Asia. In my previous article, I proposed a model that distinguishes three distinct stages of Vaiśeṣika's reception in East Asia (Snuviškis 2021):

**The first stage, Vaiśeṣika in China Before Xuánzàng (Early Fifth Century–648)**, involved the introduction of Vaiśeṣika ideas in the Chinese cultural sphere. The content of the earliest Chinese sources on Vaiśeṣika reveals a preoccupation with Indian realities, likely derived directly from the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*. The two main avenues for the introduction of Vaiśeṣika ideas during this period are: 1) texts connected to the Madhyamaka (三論宗) and *Satyasiddhi* (成實宗) traditions brought to China by Kumārajīva; 2) texts related to the Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha tradition.

**The second stage, Vaiśeṣika within the Consciousness-Only Tradition (648–Mid-Eighteenth Century)**, is defined by the influx of information regarding Vaiśeṣika, primarily originating from a single source: Xuánzàng (玄奘) and his established textual legacy within the Consciousness-Only school (唯識宗). During the latter half of his life, Xuánzàng led a team of translators, collectively translating seventy-five texts. For Vaiśeṣika, the completion of the translation of *Daśapadārthī* on May 15, 648 is the most significant event. During the entire period, discussions

of Vaiśeṣika ideas, aside from *Daśapadārthī*, were primarily found in areas of Buddhist study exclusively promoted by the Consciousness-Only school lineage (Wei 34-38). These include detailed commentaries on (1) the “Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only” or *Chéng Wéishí Lùn* (成唯識論); (2) the principles of Buddhist logic (因明) based on the transmission of *Nyāyapraveśa* (因明入正理論); and (3) *Abhidharmakośa* (俱舍論).

**The final period, Vaiśeṣika in the Buddhist Curriculum: The Edo Commentaries on *Daśapadārthī* (Eighteenth–Mid Nineteenth Centuries)**, is distinguished by the appearance of direct commentaries on *Daśapadārthī*, aimed at synthesizing all the information about Vaiśeṣika that had arrived in East Asia from the time of Kumārajīva to the Edo period. Although the Consciousness-Only school did not endure in China, it successfully established itself in Japan, bringing with it the Vaiśeṣika legacy. The beginning of the period is designated by the first identifiable commentary on *Daśapadārthī*, *Shōshūjikkugironki* (勝宗十句義論記). It was written by a Shingon monk from the Buzan branch (豐山), Hōjū Chidō (法住智幢, 1723-1800), in 1752. The end is the second half of the nineteenth century, which witnessed the modernization and globalization of Japan.

According to the entries of the “Union Catalog of Early Japanese Books”, up to forty commentaries on *Daśapadārthī* from this period still exist, counting from the first commentary of Hōjū Chidō down to the very end of the nineteenth century. The majority of these commentaries are preserved in libraries or temple archives in Japan as manuscripts. However, some were

printed immediately after they were written, and thus have been circulated on a larger scale. In the subsequent section, I provide a succinct description of *Daśapadārthī* and introduce the two commentaries on it written by Kiben and Kōgen, which are the focus of this article.

### 3. The Structure and Content of *Daśapadārthī*, Kiben’s Commentary, and Kōgen’s Subcommentary

*Daśapadārthī* is a relatively unorthodox text within the Vaiśeṣika texts, as it outlines an uncommon number of ten *padārthas*, rather than the typical six. Additionally, it features peculiar notions in Vaiśeṣika epistemology, such as the absence of a description of yogic perception or the non-differentiation between the means and result of knowledge. Furthermore, it does not provide a clear explanation of liberation or a clear statement of the treatise’s purpose at the beginning of the text. However, the most notable aspect of *Daśapadārthī* is its structure, which serves as a perfect example of the *śāstra* genre in terms of neat Vaiśeṣika doctrinal classification.

The structure of *Daśapadārthī* consists of two chapters. The first chapter lists all *padārthas* and provides definitions for each of them, while the second chapter discusses each *padārtha* in further detail. Although the chapters in *Daśapadārthī* do not have specific titles, the section on Vaiśeṣika in *Chéng Wéishí Lùn Shùjì* (成唯識論述記) has corresponding sections with *Daśapadārthī*. The latter sections list the “general and specific names” (列總別名) for *padārthas* and “bring forth their nature” (出體性) through definitions, then classify and explain various aspects of

each *padārtha* (諸門辨釋).

While *Daśapadārthī* concludes with these aspects, *Chéng Wéishí Lùn Shùjì* continues with a presentation of the main thesis of Vaiśeṣika and its detailed refutation. Based on this, I hypothesize that the thesis originally presented in *Chéng Wéishí Lùn* relies on the presentation of Vaiśeṣika in *Daśapadārthī*, which, due to its clear exposition of Vaiśeṣika ideas, motivated Xuánzàng to translate (or perhaps even compile) it.

Returning to the Edo period, among the commentaries on *Daśapadārthī*, Kiben's *Shōshūjikkugironshaku* (勝宗十句義論釋) stands out as the most prominent. Composed in 1773, its popularity is evidenced by the numerous manuscripts and circulating copies of prints from 1779. The reasons for its popularity may include Kiben's status as a renowned Japanese Buddhist thinker (active in Kyōto and Nara) belonging to the Consciousness-Only (Hossō 法相) school of the latter half of the 18th century, with around 40 works to his name (Ichiko 53). The length of the commentary, two fascicles, and 62 pages in the modern edition of *Zōhokaitei Nihon Daizōkyō* (増補改訂日本大藏經), makes it a manageable size for study, unlike the longer commentaries such as Rinjō Kaidō's (林常快道, 1751-1810), which is 5 fascicles and 122 pages in the same edition, or the shorter ones like Hōun Usui's (寶雲烏水), which is one fascicle and 33 pages.

Additionally, Kiben's commentary offers a personal touch, as he presents his own opinions on Vaiśeṣika rather than simply reiterating those of older East Asian interpreters. For instance, Kiben dedicates a subchapter, “the ascertainment of the intention in creating the commentary” (辨造釋意), where he explains his

personal motivation for writing the commentary, a rare example of a monk recording his rationale for writing a commentary. Furthermore, in certain sections, Kiben even delves into rare musings about the relationship between Vaiśeṣika and Buddhism, making his commentary a valuable resource for comparative studies.

However, among the surviving commentaries on *Daśapadārthī*, the commentary by Kiben is even more intriguing as it uniquely received further commentary by Kōgen. Kōgen was a Buddhist scholar belonging to the Shingon school. He lived most of his life in Koyasan (高野山), Shakamonin (釋迦文院). Approximately 15 works are attributed to him, with the majority being about *Abhidharmakośa* (俱舍論), earning him the reputation of being an expert in *abhidharma* (Ibid. 530-531).

He named his commentary on Kiben's text as "records of critical observations," or alternatively, "records of observations from a supplementary angle" (*bōkanroku* 傍觀錄), implying a critique on Kiben's understanding of *Daśapadārthī*. This is reflected in the structure of Kōgen's text. In contrast to Kiben and other Edo period commentaries on *Daśapadārthī*, where the majority of the space in the commentaries is dedicated to line-by-line quotation of *Daśapadārthī* and the commentator's explanation of the main body of the text, Kōgen divides his text into problematic issues to be expounded upon. The following are 37 problematic issues that Kōgen introduces with the word "criticism" (批云) regarding Kiben's commentary on *Daśapadārthī*:

- (1) Non-existent quotation from *Abhidharmakośa* (俱舍論).
- (2) Misinterpretation of the character *děng* (等) in the Vaiśeṣika definition of the self (*ātman* 我).
- (3) Misinterpretation of the Vaiśeṣika notion of inherent cause (*samavāya-kāraṇa* 和合因緣).
- (4) Incorrect division of really existing support (實有所依託) and non-really existing of that which is supported (非實有能依託).
- (5) Statement that air (*vāyu* 風) is tactile (*sparsavat* 有觸) like earth (*pṛthivī* 地), water (*āpas* 水), and fire (*tejas* 火).
- (6) Inaccurate assertion that eternality (*nityatva* 常住) necessarily implies the function of an inherent cause (*samavāya-kāraṇa* 和合因緣).
- (7) Confusion between substance atoms (*paramāṇu* 極微) and the quality of smallness (*aṇutva* 微體).
- (8) Another non-existent quotation from *Abhidharmakośa* (俱舍論).
- (9) Ambiguous use of the word *jīwēi* (極微).
- (10) Misinterpretation of the Vaiśeṣika concept of mind (*manas* 意).
- (11) Misinterpretation of commonness (*sāmānya* 同) perceived by all sense organs (一切根所取) as implying dependence of imperceptibles and perceivables by the self and mind on sense organs.
- (12) Supposed proof that self-perception (我取) depends on sense organ perception (根取).
- (13) *Padārtha* of commonness-particularity (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*?)

- 俱分) in the context of perception by all sense organs (一切根所取) or eyes and touch (眼觸所取).
- (14) Ambiguous meaning of the concept *yǎnchù suǒqǔ* (眼觸所取).
  - (15) Misinterpretation of the correct meaning of *yǎnchù* (眼觸).
  - (16) Two interpretations of the *yǎnchù* compound: *tatpuruṣa* (依主) and *dvandva* (相違).
  - (17) Misinterpretation of *yǎnchù* as a *tatpuruṣa* compound.
  - (18) Misinterpretation of *yǎnchù* as the cause for the remaining sense organs.
  - (19) Misinterpretation of *yǎnchù* in *dvandva* compound, resulting in the devaluation of the touch organ.
  - (20) Incorrect *tatpuruṣa* and *dvandva* interpretations of *yǎnchù* stemming from Kuījī (窺基, 632-682) and Pǔguāng (普光, ?-664?).
  - (21) Inaccurate summary of the implications of the *yǎnchù* concept.
  - (22) Misinterpretation of *wú chù* (無觸) as *wú yǎnchù* (無眼觸).
  - (23) Incorrect classification of eternal (*nitya* 常) and non-eternal substances (*anitya* 無常).
  - (24) The issue concerning the size of the mind (*manas* 意).
  - (25) Two categories of non-perceivable objects (非現境).
  - (26) Ineffective discussion of the perceptibility of primary atomic compounds (子微) by conflating the perspectives of two separate *vaiśeṣika* schools (the root 末部 and branch schools 本部).

- (27) The qualities of ether (*ākāśa* 空) and other non-material substances as non-perceivable objects in sense organ perception (根取非現境).
- (28) Omission of the character for inferential knowledge (*anumāna* 比) when discussing non-perceptible qualities of *dharma* (法), *adharmā* (非法), and *saṃskāra* (行).
- (29) Misconception of a disjunction (*vibhāga* 離) causing a conjunction (*samyoga* 合).
- (30) Exploration of the sense organ perception of qualities (*guṇa* 德).
- (31) Failure to reflect by Kiben on the differences Between Kuījī's and *Daśapadārthī* understanding of certain characteristics of perception (了相).
- (32) The importance of color (*rūpa* 色) in substance perception and the problem of air perception.
- (33) Misinterpretation of life activity (*jīvana* 命緣) as a sense organ.
- (34) Misinterpretation of certain aspects regarding qualities pervading their locales (遍所依).
- (35) Misinterpretation of the relationship between quality and materiality (有德應有礙).
- (36) Misinterpretation of the acting body (身業) as a non-inherent cause.
- (37) Misinterpretation of a particular aspect of *saṃskāra* (行).

## 4. An Analysis of Kōgen's Critique of Kiben's Interpretation of Vaiśeṣika: A Topic-by-Topic Examination

This section addresses the 37 problematic issues raised by Kōgen with regards to Kiben's commentary. Each issue is analyzed by quoting relevant passages from Kōgen, Kiben's commentary, and *Daśapadārthī*, with the aim of providing a clear explanation of the main concerns. The analysis also considers the validity of Kōgen's criticisms in light of Indian Vaiśeṣika sources. The ultimate goal is to shed light on key differences and novel aspects of Kiben's and Kōgen's understandings of Vaiśeṣika. The 37 issues are classified and grouped into eight categories for the purpose of analysis:

- I Inherent and Non-Inherent Causes (3, 4, 6, 34, 36-37).
- II Touch and Perceptibility of Air (5, 32).
- III The Concept of *Yānchù* (*Cakṣuḥsparsana* 眼觸) (14-22).
- IV Non-Perceivable Objects (25-27).
- V Other Perception-related Issues (11-13, 30-31).
- VI Misinterpretation of the Vaiśeṣika Notion of Mind (10, 24).
- VII Misquotation, Misinterpretation, Conflation, or Omission of Specific Vaiśeṣika Concepts (1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 28, 35).
- VIII Other Misinterpretations of Vaiśeṣika Doctrines (23, 29, 33).



#### 4.1 Inherent and Non-Inherent Causes (3, 4, 6, 34, 36-37)

**Problem 3** addresses Kiben's partial misunderstanding of the difference between inherent (*samavāya-kāraṇa* 和合因緣) and non-inherent causes (*asamavāya-kāraṇa* 不和合因緣). Kiben dedicates a substantial portion of his commentary to elucidating the concept of the inherent cause. He cites six interpretations from previous East Asian scholars, but finds none of them satisfactory (Kiben 9-11).

Kiben interprets inherence (和合) as an essence or entity (和合為體) that engenders an inseparable relationship between two or more entities. He views cause (因緣) as something that provides support<sup>2</sup> (所依託) (Ibid. 11). Although this understanding of inherence aligns closely with the Vaiśeṣika perspective, Kōgen suggests a more precise characterization of the inherent cause. This would functionally distinguish between proximate support (親所依) and remote support (疏所依).

According to Kōgen, an inherent cause encompasses the notion that a substance is the nearest support for qualities or actions that are inherent to the substance itself. Conversely, a non-inherent cause refers to a substance that relates to qualities or actions of other substances, or to qualities and actions that are in relation with each other<sup>3</sup> (Kōgen 1).

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<sup>2</sup> 謂和合者，即和合為體，令實等能不離相屬，此詮智因。又和合句，體是一物，故無此與彼別異和合之相。因緣者，謂所依託義，非如大乘自體辨生為親因。

<sup>3</sup> 一段主意，和合謂和合句為體，因緣謂所依託義。九實皆是和合因緣，不和合因緣〔……〕和合因緣是親所依，不和合因緣是疏所依。

**Problem 4** addresses the incorrect categorization of the truly existent support (實有所依託) and the non-truly existent supported (非實有能依託) (Kiben 11). Kiben makes a surprising assertion that the support or inherent cause is truly existent (實有), while the supported, namely qualities or actions, are non-truly existent (非實有). Kōgen promptly counters that all *padārthas* are truly existent in Vaiśeṣika philosophy, and no distinction is made between truly and non-truly existent objects participating in the relationship of inherence<sup>4</sup> (Kōgen 2).

**Problem 6** pertains to the false assumption that eternity is implied to be an inherent cause<sup>5</sup> (Kiben 11). According to Vaiśeṣikas, even non-eternal substances can still serve as inherent causes<sup>6</sup> (Kōgen 2-3). For instance, a tree, despite being non-eternal, can perfectly be an inherent cause for its multiple qualities and actions.

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謂有德實與彼之自所有德，不離屬著，親為所依託。有動作實與彼之自所有業，不離屬著，親為所依託，是名和合因緣是親所依。雖實皆有德望他所有德，亦實有無德理，故與他實所有德，無不離屬著理，而疏為所依託。無動作德與動作業，無不離屬著理，而疏為所依託，是名不和合因緣是疏所依。

- 4 又言實有為所依託，非實有物為能依託者，惡！是何寤語！《勝論》宗計三世實有，能依所依皆是實有物體，無有非實有法，是故十句義論諸門分別中，雖有常無常門，而不立實有非實有門。
- 5 若常、若實有、若有德、若有業，隨是為和合因緣體。
- 6 釋主從來不明和合因緣，誤加「常住」贅言，故至此設無明問答。請看所引論文，既言如一切有德和合因緣，不言如常住和合因緣和合因緣依有德，不關常無常可以推知。且子微以上四實雖無常，而為和合因緣果歸于有德有實有義如上所辨豈不妙乎？又上（十四紙）言常住者所依託，而有子微以上難於是妄通上言無常者能依託而有常住德句難何不妄通其說無主宰何其如是？

**Problem 34**<sup>7</sup> delves into certain aspects concerning the pervasion of qualities within their respective locales. Kiben clarifies that only the mental qualities of the self, sound (*śabda* 聲) associated with ether, and conjunctions (*samyoga* 合) and disjunctions (*vibhāga* 離) are qualities that do not pervade their respective substances (不遍所依). This is due to the fact that these qualities (or at least some of them) cannot coexist simultaneously<sup>8</sup> (合處無離，樂處無苦) (Kiben 62-63).

However, Kōgen takes issue with this explanation, contrasting it with another passage from *Daśapadārthī*, which asserts that actions (*karma* 業) pervade their respective substances. Kōgen's primary concern lies in Kiben's dubious assertion that conjunctions and disjunctions must reside in substances possessing action (合、離必在有動作實). If actions pervade their substances, how is it that conjunction and disjunction cannot pervade them? This discrepancy suggests a potential error. This is particularly evident when considering the explanation that non-pervasion implies the non-existence of certain entities at the same time. For instance, upward and downward actions or expansion and contraction cannot occur simultaneously, therefore actions do not

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<sup>7</sup> While some might argue that this issue does not directly relate to the concept of inherence, it's important to note that the main subject of this paragraph, pervasion, is indeed a direct consequence of the inherence of qualities and actions.

<sup>8</sup> 餘不遍所依者，餘謂：覺、樂、苦、欲、瞋、勤勇、念因行、法、非法、合、離、聲，如是十二，非同所依。合處無離，樂處無苦等。又覺等但在我，合、離必在有動作實等。聲但在空等，非在餘處，云不遍所依也。

seem to pervade in the previously explained sense. Furthermore, conjunctions and disjunctions occur even in substances that lack action. Taking these discrepancies into account, Kōgen concludes that Kiben's commentary on pervasion is flawed<sup>9</sup> (Kōgen 14).

**Problem 36** addresses a specific characterization of a non-inherent cause. When describing an instance of the *padārtha* of action, a non-material quality of the self, specifically internal effort (*prayatna* 勤勇), is said to function as a non-inherent cause<sup>10</sup> (Kiben 69). While this description is accurate, it risks overshadowing the importance of the inherent cause. The non-material self-substance, along with the quality of internal effort, serve as non-inherent causes, while the body acts as an inherent cause for action. Kōgen suggests that bodily action, like any action in material reality, should be defined based on both inherent and non-inherent causes. In particular, an inherently material cause, in this case the body, should be distinctly recognized<sup>11</sup> (Kōgen 14). However, Kiben's description

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<sup>9</sup> 此一段亦非論意。不可依用如前釋於所依託處同時並有者，是為遍所依於所依託處有此時無彼，有彼時無此。無同時並存者。是為不遍所依。此與論（十一紙右）明業遍不遍所依有二說中初說同，此義為善。然業依有礙五實所依實有遍不遍，故又約所依有後一說德隨應依有礙無礙九實。雖所依有遍不遍而不可成約所依。釋既遍行我實所有覺等論，判為不遍所依，故釋主後一解不合業下二說唯是今按之孽說。論（六紙左以下）分九實一一明具德中九實皆有合離二德，而何言合離必在有動作實哉？其謬可察。

<sup>10</sup> 身業在有礙實，我德無礙，以無礙德為所依託，故云不和合。云何以他德為所依託？謂無策勵則不發業，無念因、作因行則不應發業，故身業初者，猶云初剎那。

<sup>11</sup> 此釋迂遠也。且非宗意。若業在有礙實我德無礙以無礙德為所依託故為不和合，則業無礙所依五實有礙無礙業以有礙實為所依託，有礙實

seems elusive, potentially failing to emphasize the significance of the inherent cause and instead focusing on the non-inherent cause.

**Problem 37** is about the misinterpretation of a particular aspect of the *saṃskāra* (行) quality. The problem occurs with regard to the definition of the first and follow-up actions in the body. In *Daśapadārthī*, it is asserted that posterior actions in the body occur with *saṃskāra* as a non-inherent cause. Kiben comments that this is wrong because, in this case, if a *saṃskāra* is a cause of action (作因者), it should be an inherent cause<sup>12</sup> (Kiben 70). Kōgen, in his commentary, notes that whether this *saṃskāra* is a cause for recollection (念因者) or action, it cannot be an inherent cause for an action<sup>13</sup> (Kōgen 15). An inherent cause can only be a substance.

#### 4.2 Touch and Perceptibility of Air (5, 32)

**Problem 5** relates to a questionable sentence mentioned by Kiben: “Three substances possess touch: earth, water, and

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亦為業為不和合耶？然勝宗意，有礙實是為業和合因緣，非不和合因緣。如次上明。又覺乘等與我和合時覺等無礙，空時方亦無礙。故應空等為覺等為因緣。豈有此理哉？今以德無礙義釋不和合，不亦妄哉？唯實為業為和合因緣由有動作實有，義德為業為不和合因緣由無動作實有義。此即雖業必德為所依託發動，而德無動作無有常，故無可和合理，故不和合因緣。

<sup>12</sup> 行者，念因行為不和合因緣，自可審知；作因行由業親生，應和合因緣，云何為不和合因緣耶？

<sup>13</sup> 批云：惡！是作麼閒話！若念因、若作因皆是無動作德，無可與動作業和合之理。故不和合因緣若親若疏，德皆無動作。故德因行亦皆不和合因緣。

fire”<sup>14</sup> (Kiben 12). According to Kōgen, this sentence is incorrect and contradicts both *Daśapadārthī*<sup>15</sup> and Kiben’s own statement regarding air in another paragraph of his commentary (Kōgen 2). Kiben explains in his commentary on that paragraph in *Daśapadārthī* that “There are four substances with touch: earth, water, fire, and air, possessing external touch (外觸)”<sup>16</sup> (Kiben 62). The doubtfulness of the first sentence may stem from Kiben’s accidental omission of air as a substance, which is universally recognized in Indian Vaiśeṣika as having a touch quality<sup>17</sup>. It is noteworthy to bring to light an intriguing term referred to by Kiben, which is absent in traditional Indian Vaiśeṣika philosophy: “external touch” (外觸). Kiben uses this term to distinguish it from “internal touch” (內觸), which exists within the mind substance (manas 意)<sup>18</sup>.

**Problem 32** concerns the imperceptibility of air. Air is unique among Vaiśeṣika’s elemental substances in that it cannot be perceived in its composite forms. In the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* (2.1.8-19), there is a discussion with an unnamed opponent which determines that the existence of air can be inferred or established

<sup>14</sup> 有觸實者，地、水、火三。

<sup>15</sup> According to *Daśapadārthī*, touch is possessed by four substances: 四有觸，謂：地、水、火、風 (Maticandra 44)。

<sup>16</sup> 有觸實者，地、水、火、風有外觸實。

<sup>17</sup> Sūtra No. 2.1.4 from *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* (Kaṇāda 86): *Vāyuh sparśavān* - “Air possesses touch”. *Caturṇām dravyārambhakatvasparśavattve* - “There are four substances that are touchable and can produce other substances”, i.e., air is one of these substances (Prašastapāda 4).

<sup>18</sup> 以意實有礙攝，今有觸中不攝意實有礙，與觸云何異？答：近來有釋，意雖有礙，有內無外觸，故攝無觸也 (Kiben 44)。

through tradition, but cannot be perceived through the sensory organs. This idea is further confirmed in sūtras 4.1.8<sup>19</sup> and *Padārthadharmasamgraha*<sup>20</sup>. However, one early commentator of *Padārthadharmasangraha*, Vyomaśiva, contradicts this, asserting that air can be sensed through perceptual experience (*pratyakṣeṇopalambhāt*)<sup>21</sup>.

Kōgen critiques a section from *Daśapadārthī* that excludes air from being perceived (Maticandra 59). Kiben’s response to the issue is, “Air does not possess color and has no correspondence with the eyes. It is excluded from perception as it cannot be seen”<sup>22</sup> (Kiben 59). Kōgen offers a counterargument, asserting that “the grasping of objects by all five sense organs results in perception” (五根取五境同是現量). In other words, Kōgen emphasizes that the apprehension of any object by its corresponding sense organ constitutes direct perception, thereby highlighting the touch organ’s equal validity in perceiving air.

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<sup>19</sup> *Rūpasamṣkārābhāvād vāyāv anupalabdhiḥ* - “Since there is no trace for color, the air is not perceived”. The word *saṃskārā* may stand for *samavāya* as well, see (Isaacson 35-36). Thus, alternatively, the sūtra could be read as: “Since there is no inherence of color [in the air], it is not perceived”.

<sup>20</sup> *Trayāṅgām pratyakṣatvarūpavadvadravatvāni*: “The three substances have the characteristics of being directly perceived and having color”. The three substances are earth, water, and fire.

<sup>21</sup> See Vyomaśiva’s explanation (Vyomaśiva 90): *Tathā hi spārsānavyāpārād aparokṣa jñānam utpadyamānaṃ dṛṣṭam vāyur vāti śīto vāyur uṣṇo vāyur iti* - “Thus, in fact, it is from the operation of touch that the arising of cognition not exceeding the senses, such as “the wind blows, the wind is cold, the wind is hot” is experienced”.

<sup>22</sup> 風實無色、無對眼、無可見故，非現境故，除。

This is partially supported by the fact that, according to Kōgen's interpretation, Vaiśeṣika recognizes perception through “the eyes and the body”<sup>23</sup> (眼身所取). Thus, acknowledging the ability to perceive air through the body aligns with the principles of Vaiśeṣika theory<sup>24</sup> (善協於論意). Furthermore, Kōgen argues that Kiben's assertion that perception is linked to visibility is incorrect, as “The sensory experiences of smell and taste, which are perceived through the organs of the nose and tongue, should not be disregarded as forms of perception simply because they lack visible properties”<sup>25</sup>.

Consequently, Kiben does not dispute that despite being invisible, qualities such as smell, taste, touch, and sound can be perceived by the nose, tongue, skin (or body), or ears. Kiben's denial of perception primarily relates to substances without color. This suggests that if one can perceive substances with color, it would also be possible to perceive other qualities, actions, and commonness-particularities. However, from a philosophical perspective, Kōgen's argument is compelling as it challenges the idea that eyes and the color quality hold a superior position over other senses and qualities. For instance, if one visually perceives the color of fire and then the fire itself, why would it be unreasonable to argue that the cake is perceived by sensing its

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<sup>23</sup> For an in-depth discussion of this phrase, please refer to the section on the issues surrounding “The Concept of *Yānchū*” below.

<sup>24</sup> 五根取五境同是現量〔……〕勝宗中於地等眼身所取雖有二說，皆是根取現量。是故有人加風實者善協於論意，何為非現故除耶（Kōgen 13）。

<sup>25</sup> 若無可見故者，鼻舌取香味亦應非現香味無可見故（Ibid.）。

taste, or that air substance is perceived through a windy touch? Kōgen’s critique aligns him with Vyomaśiva and highlights two differing Vaiśeṣika positions on the perception of air.

### 4.3 The Concept of *Yānchù*1. (Cakṣuḥsparśana 眼觸)(14-22)

Approximately 20% of Kōgen’s text is dedicated to the discussion of the issues surrounding the concept *yānchù* (“eyes and touch”) (Kōgen 6-9). This is a challenging allocation of space, given that *yānchù* is a highly marginal term in the Indian Vaiśeṣika tradition and occurs only three times in *Daśapadārthī* (Maticandra 39, 55). In contrast, Kiben uses the term 49 times in his commentary, with the majority of these instances appearing in three pages where he comments on two occurrences of *yānchù* in *Daśapadārthī* (Kiben 39-41). Kiben’s extensive discussion of the term, as well as its frequent usage elsewhere in his commentary on *Daśapadārthī*, suggests that it holds a significant place in his understanding of Vaiśeṣika. However, according to Kōgen, Kiben misunderstands *yānchù* and reads it in places where it does not appear.

Before exploring the various issues related to *yānchù* raised by Kōgen, let us examine how the equivalent term *cakṣuḥsparśana* appears in Indian Vaiśeṣika and *Daśapadārthī*. One of the earliest references to *cakṣuḥsparśana* can be found in *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, where it is mentioned in the context of defining the perception of specific qualities and actions: “Number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, moisture, fluidity, velocity and action are perceived by the eyes and the skin, through their inherence in

perceptible substances”<sup>26</sup> (Prašastapāda 44-45). This quotation suggests that when one perceives (with the eyes) perceptible substances such as earth, water, and fire that possess color, all of the aforementioned qualities and actions can be perceived not only with the eyes, but also through touch organ. In other words, according to Praśastapāda, the touch organ (primarily the skin) alone can only allow one to perceive touch quality, but when combined with the eyes, touch enables the perception of more entities.

Sūtra No. 4.1.12 of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* conveys a similar idea to Praśastapāda’s statement, but only includes perception through the eyes and omits skin perception<sup>27</sup> (Kaṇāda 142). Later commentators on the sūtra likely tried to align it with Praśastapāda’s meaning by adding skin perception to the eyes<sup>28</sup>. However, in *Daśapadārthī* the term *caḥṣuḥsparśana* (as *yānchū*) extends its recognized meaning of perception of qualities to include the perception of the commonness-particularity (*sāmānya-viśeṣa* 俱分) of actions (業性) and substances (實性). It is not surprising to see the extension of *caḥṣuḥsparśana* to encompass the perception of commonness-particularity in actions as they are similar to qualities. However, including *caḥṣuḥsparśana* in the realm of substances leads to uncharted

<sup>26</sup> *Samkhyāparimāṇaprthaktvasamyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvasnehadrav atvavegakarmaṇām pratyakṣadravyasamavāyāc caḥṣuḥsparśanābhyām grahaṇam.*

<sup>27</sup> *Samkhyāḥ parimāṇāni prthaktvaṃ samyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpīdravyasamavāyāc cāḥṣuḥsparśanāni.*

<sup>28</sup> *Sparśanāni ceti śeṣaḥ* (Vādīndra 45).

territory. This could suggest that substances are not only perceived through the eyes but also through touch.

Let us examine the issues raised by Kōgen. **Problem 14** concerns two ancient interpretations (古義) of *yǎnchù* that Kiben brings up. According to the first interpretation, *yǎnchù* refers to “eyes and skin organs” (眼根及皮根), meaning that “touch” (觸) pertains to the skin organ. Kiben states that this interpretation is grounded in a passage from the *Abhidharmakośa* (阿毘達磨俱舍論), which aims to refute the Vaiśeṣika philosophy and equates *yǎnchù* with the phrase “eyes and body” (眼身). The second interpretation is based on a passage about Vaiśeṣika in the *Chéng Wéishí Lùn Shùjì* (成唯識論述記) which suggests that *yǎnchù* means “eyes and so on” (眼等), implying the perception by all sense organs (一切根所取)<sup>29</sup>. Kōgen offers a brief evaluation, asserting that the first interpretation is accurate while the second is erroneous<sup>30</sup> (Kōgen 6).

**Problem 15** focuses on two evaluations (判是非) made by Kiben concerning the last two interpretations of *yǎnchù*. In his evaluation of the first interpretation, Kiben finds that the explanation is incomplete (未得解盡) and that *Abhidharmakośa* lacks clarity with regards to the relevant phrase. Regarding the second interpretation, Kiben is more confident in refuting it

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<sup>29</sup> 出古義者，古有二釋：一云：眼根及皮根，如舌根稱味根故，皮名觸，此說由「俱舍」第十二云：彼宗中自許地等眼身所取。二云：觸字是等字誤，此說以「成唯識疏」為據，云：地等、色等別俱分，一切根所取，故眼觸者是眼等，即一切根所取（Kiben 39）。

<sup>30</sup> 二釋中，初說實勝宗之正義，後說是後人之妄說。

and asserts that it does not qualify as a true theory of Vaiśeṣika ( 鹿謬失勝宗實義 ). He argues that one can only obtain this interpretation by reading *Chéng Wéishí Lùn Shùjì* in a specific way, but general reading does not support it<sup>31</sup> (Kiben 39).

Kōgen, on the other hand, argues that Kiben has a fixed mindset ( 有一般鑿意 ), as he fails to acknowledge the validity of the first interpretation. According to Kōgen, Kiben misunderstands the concept of *yǎnchù* by doubting the notion of touch standing for the skin organ. Kōgen argues that there are only two theories about the perception of elemental substances: either the eyes alone perceive earth, water, and fire, or the four substances, including air, are perceived by the eyes and touch together. Kōgen mocks Kiben's correct rejection of the second interpretation as coincidental, stating that even after a thousand attempts, one may still chance upon the truth ( 千慮一得 ) by sheer probability<sup>32</sup> (Kōgen 6).

**Problem 16** addresses two contemporary interpretations of *yǎnchù* ( 今義 ). The first interpretation suggests that *yǎnchù* refers

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31 第一說，雖理通皮根名觸所由，未得解盡，「俱舍」所說，總說非委細釋，難以為證。第二說，鹿謬失勝宗實義，不可須說。以「基疏」釋雖為誠證，非證；云一切根所取，合釋地等、色等，故云一切根；若別釋，應如此論說，故非觸為等證〔……〕故初後二說俱不成。

32 批云：釋主胸中有一般鑿意，於論宗不合者，實不知正義之所以為正義。故雖評取第一說，而猶言雖理通皮根名觸所由，未得解盡。以余言之，釋主誤解眼觸所取，故於皮根名觸所由，大生孽說者也。且勝論宗中雖有眼身同取四大，眼唯取地水火二說，而於四大眼皮二根外，更無有餘根取義。何以言《俱舍》總說？雖以為證。此其不符契於胸中鑿意，故云爾歟？不亦冤乎！其評斥第二說者偶當矣。可謂千慮一得也。

to “the touch of the eyes” (眼之觸), which implies a *tatpuruṣa* (依主) compound where the first member qualifies the second. This interpretation is novel and not found in ancient interpretations. The second interpretation is similar to the first ancient interpretation, in which *chù* represents the skin or body organ and its relationship with the eyes implies a separate status (眼與觸別) as in a *dvandva* (相違) compound.

Furthermore, Kiben cites master Pūguāng (普光, ?-664?) who provides two different readings of the aforementioned passage from *Abhidharmakośa*, corresponding to the *tatpuruṣa* and *dvandva* interpretations. In the first reading by Pūguāng, “the touch of the eyes” is capable of perceiving all four elemental substances. In accordance with the second interpretation, it is the skin organ that can perceive all four substances by grasping different touches, such as hot, cold, etc.<sup>33</sup> (Kiben 39-40).

Kōgen argues that the *tatpuruṣa* position is false and the correct Vaiśeṣika position is the *dvandva* (Kōgen 6). He critiques *tatpuruṣa* as illogical, claiming that if it were correct, the skin (or body) would have little function as a sense organ, other than perceiving touch quality. Furthermore, if one takes the phrase “the touch of the eyes” (眼之觸) seriously, one could conclude that, in addition to touch quality, the eyes also possess the touch

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<sup>33</sup> 大抵眼觸之言以二意說：一云：眼之觸，依主釋也；二云：眼與觸別，所取同時，取是相違釋。光法師云：勝論宗中一說地、水、火、風，眼根俱取四；一說眼根但取地、水、火三，身根能取四種，所以者何？以身能觸冷、煖等風，故身非眼。云云。今謂光法師叙此二說，應知三藏相傳說，第一說當依主釋義，第二說即相違釋也。

organ. As a result, a substance (the eyes) would not only possess substance (in its atomic form) and quality, but would also have another substance (the touch organ) which would possess smaller substances (in atomic form) (實, 有實, 有德實外, 更有, 有實, 實). Kōgen expresses surprise that the interpretation of “the touch of the eyes” leads to a heterodox theory<sup>34</sup> (ibid. 6-7).

**Problem 17** addresses a further aspect of *yānchù* according to Kiben, namely that the eye, as an organ composed of fiery substance, reveals the intrinsic quality of touch for additional perception. The touch of the eyes allows for perceiving many other qualities, such as number, dimension, separateness, etc. This perception is likened to heavy cognition<sup>35</sup> (愍重緣; Kiben 41). Kōgen considers this explanation absurd and finds no justification for why the eyes should perceive touch. For example, although the nose possesses color, taste, smell, and touch, it perceives only smell.

As stated by Kōgen, touch is neither an object nor a subject with respect to the eyes. If it is a subject, then it is the skin organ that is perceiving. If it is an object, touch is that which is

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34 若第一說依主，唯眼根所取，則不翹違眼身所取論文。抑亦身根於四大為全無所取耶？豈得有觸實不為皮根所取哉！且依彼解此眼之觸依主得名者，亦應依此解彼眼之身依主得名，如眼有觸德亦應眼有身根。果爾實有實有德實外更有有實實。此即鶴鷗開宗以來稀有之奇說、別立一箇宗計。嗚呼！

35 詳彼宗義，眼觸謂於火實，即眼根彰自觸德，我、意合所緣取，即眼之觸，依主釋也。若唯眼取各一根所取攝，唯取色德，今云眼觸非唯火實，眼根取色德、火實，眼根彰自觸德緣取，則取色同處。數、量、別體、合離、彼體、此體、重體、勢用及實性、色性，謂彰觸德緣者，猶如云愍重緣。

perceived by the skin but not something perceived by the eyes. And even if it is neither a subject nor an object, it should already exist in the eyes and does not need to be revealed. Furthermore, if it is revealed, it is still an object perceived by the skin organ. Kōgen mocks the idea that the touch of the eyes can reveal the perception of additional qualities, comparing it to a magnet attracting iron, amber attracting dust, or an elephant's trunk curling and picking up various objects<sup>36</sup> (Kōgen 7).

**Problem 18** continues the discussion with another unconventional idea proposed by Kiben. He posits that the eyes, which reveal their tactile quality, enable the other sense organs to manifest their tactile qualities and perceive additional properties. Although ears are not traditionally considered to possess tactile capabilities, they are purportedly reliant on touch, as sounds are generated by substances with tactile properties<sup>37</sup> (Kiben 40).

Kōgen argues that despite sense organs such as the tongue and nose possessing qualities like number and dimension, they

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<sup>36</sup> 云眼之觸依主釋眼根彰自觸德緣取則取色同處數量別體等猶如云擘重緣。惡！是何狂言！〔……〕彰觸德緣取者，以觸為能緣耶？將所緣歟？若言能取，則觸是皮根所取一境，非能取法；若言所取，則觸皮所取，非眼所取。若云非能取，亦非所取，唯眼所有，眼彰之。緣則眼所有，觸不彰則已矣。彰則皮所取一境。何有假所取德增能取用以取色同時餘境如是徵責所謂彰緣觸德唯有虛言無有實義。此蓋由謬解根取故也〔……〕此其意以觸德為如磁石吸鐵、如琥珀吸塵、如大象鼻頭卷取諸許物耶？胡為其說之奇怪也！誰不呵呵。

<sup>37</sup> 又眼根彰觸德緣取，則或有餘三根亦同取，同一具觸德故，若爾，何故但云眼觸、不云餘根觸耶？謂眼彰觸以為初故，眼觸為因，餘觸自彰，故云眼觸，不云觸。空耳根亦雖無觸，德必由觸，實三種聲生，故聲俱數、量、別體等，亦眼觸取。

are unable to perceive touch and other properties as Kiben suggests. According to Kōgen, Kiben appears to be constructing a novel heterodox doctrine beyond the scope of Vaiśeṣika<sup>38</sup> (Kōgen 7-8).

**Problem 19** addresses another aspect when attempting to elucidate the eyes and skin as standing in a *dvandva* (相違) relationship. Although *dvandva* is a correct interpretation according to Kōgen, Kiben engages in excessive exegesis that is more than dubious. Specifically, Kiben argues that in darkness, there is no cognition of the eyes' touch, as eyes perceive pitch-black and other untrue colors. Consequently, only the touch of the skin enables the perception of an object's number, dimensions, and other qualities. In other words, when in darkness, one orients oneself only by touch and not by the eyes. The same is true for a blind person who navigates and understands the world primarily through touch. For Kiben, eyes and touch can work together only when the eyes are incapable of performing the task independently, as in the cases mentioned above. Alternatively, for example, when hearing a sound, ears manifest touch and other qualities of ether, with the cooperation of the eyes and touch

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38 批云：此皆不爾。眼鼻舌皮皆有數量等。而數量等皆是眼皮二根所取，非鼻舌所取其義至德根取門應辨。然釋主誤以為鼻舌二根有觸德。取香味同處數量等。又空實所有數量等非根取非現量。然亦誤以為眼觸取。此等妄說為誤解根取義。故大素勝宗綱紀。不可依用。所引下文。固釋主誤解之病根。至彼應辨。上來所述眼觸依主義無徵可取。無理可立此。唯於勝論宗外釋主新立杜撰之說，可謂杜撰外道之宗計也。

organs<sup>39</sup> (Kiben 40-41).

According to Kōgen, only the eyes and skin can serve a dual function in perceiving their respective qualities of color and touch and, distinctly, other qualities of number, dimension, etc., while the remaining sense organs (such as ears, tongue, and nose) have only one function. The former two sense organs are comparable to a bird with two wings, while the latter three are like a unicorn, an animal with a single horn (譬如鳥之兩翼、麟之一角).

Moreover, Kōgen asserts that Kiben misinterprets touch as a subjective aspect of cognition (能緣), a concept present in Buddhist abhidharma but not in Vaiśeṣika. In Buddhist epistemology, touch (觸) can be both a tactile object corresponding to a touch quality in Vaiśeṣika and a mental factor by which a sense organ, sense object, and sense consciousness converge to produce perception. However, in Vaiśeṣika, touch does not function as a mental factor enabling perception. Kōgen correctly observes this detrimental Buddhist influence on Vaiśeṣika interpretation, resulting in the touch of the eyes or even touch related to other sense organs. Lastly, Kōgen does

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<sup>39</sup> 辨眼與觸各別同時取，相違釋義，則如暗夜雖無眼觸懸重緣，但眼根見暗色及餘色，不見實色，故其同時以皮根觸懸重緣取數、量、別體等。此是雖眼觸與皮觸緣取有別，以眼根取不得實色為因，起皮觸懸重緣取數、量、別體等。故今雖眼與觸相違得名，約眼觸與皮觸不相離，亦云眼觸所取也。如盲人因無眼觸皮觸懸重緣取數、量等，亦復如是。若在睡眠，眼根全無業用，所以皮觸亦無。由是應知，眼觸與皮觸雖別，同一時相違取也〔……〕凡聲德有觸實合離為因生，如打鐘與木合離出聲等，非因眼觸所取有，觸實合離無應取空實所有數、量等因，故耳取聲、數、量、別體等，亦眼觸所取也。

not consider darkness to be an obstacle to eye perception; therefore, both sense organs perceive on the same basis during day and night<sup>40</sup> (Kōgen 8).

**Problem 20** briefly addresses the question of why the term *yānchù* is preferable to, for instance, “the eyes and skin” (眼皮), even in a *dvandva* reading. Kiben himself responds by suggesting that *chù* (觸) can represent both skin perception and the touch of the skin (皮取亦有皮之觸), encapsulating two meanings in a single term (一名兩義全備). Specifically, *chù* can be interpreted to simultaneously denote “the touch of the eyes” (眼觸) and “the touch of the body” (身觸), leading to the ultimate *dvandva* reading<sup>41</sup> (Kiben 41). Kōgen’s rebuttal is

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40 相違釋義，實勝宗之正義。而釋主解之，於論宗不相容不啻水火。何者勝宗計云：五塵各一根所取境。數量別體等眼觸所取境。是故眼根取色亦取色同處數量等。身根取觸亦取觸同處數量等。鼻舌取香味而不能取香味同處數量等。眼身二根取彼數量等。此義至下應辨。耳根取聲而不能取聲同處數量等。彼數量等我取，非現智取之。故眼身二根各有二用。耳鼻舌三根各唯一用。諸根作用有此差別，譬如鳥之兩翼、鱗之一角。法然自爾之所然也。暗夜眼見暗色亦見暗色同處數量等。皮根同時取觸亦取觸同處數量等此眼皮各有二用，而色觸即一根所取。數量等皆眼根所取，即勝宗之實義。然釋主云「暗夜眼唯見暗色，不取數量等。皮根取其數量等。」此釋於眼皮各減一用。猶如鳥之一翼缺失。法爾根用忽違害於勝宗實義。且云眼觸懸重緣皮觸懸重緣等語勢頗似以觸為能緣。勝宗計所觸之外決無能取之觸。不同佛家所觸之外別立能緣之觸〔……〕然釋主於身根減一用，唯云取數量等。又鼻舌取香味時香味同處數量等。若暗夜若白晝眼皮二根隨應所取境。

41 又問：若用相違釋義釋，何故不名眼皮所取耶？答：若但云眼皮，則但相違釋義，彰依主得名，義遂不相彰，所以云眼觸而不云眼皮。今云眼觸，故顯皮取亦有皮之觸，一名兩義全備。答：「二十唯識疏」意曰：眼見色時得地、水、火三，耳、鼻、舌三得聲、香、味時亦得

succinct, asserting that all these explanations are erroneous and their fallacy is evident without the need for refutation. Kiben is accused of distorting reason to align with his own perspective and misnaming things<sup>42</sup> (Kōgen 8).

With regards to **Problem 21**, Kiben summarizes by stating that the commonness-particularity (*sāmānya-viśeṣa* 俱分) of substances (實性) and actions (業性) is perceived by “the touch of the eyes” (眼觸所取), involving the previously discussed “heavy cognition” (慳重緣). Meanwhile, the perception of the commonness-particularity of qualities (德性) involves dual perception by the touch of the eyes and a single sense organ (各一根及眼觸所取). Moreover, commonness and particularity are perceived through “the touch of the eyes” in relation to all substances, including those imperceptible ones such as time, space, self, and mind.<sup>43</sup>

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三實，唯身得觸時得四大。云云此中意云，眼見色得三實，亦耳、鼻、舌三由眼色取，此約眼觸說。別論唯身觸，是約皮觸之說，眼色觸與皮觸，別作論即相違釋之證也。

42 《釋》下(八紙)明一名兼依主、相違二釋，引《慈恩》、《普光》說證，此皆妄說妄證，如上來所辯。可以推知矣。其非不待駁而明也。以要評之，上來所述依主、相違二釋引證立義皆是狂文，屈理以從己之見者也。苟狂屈文理以從己見，則指鹿云馬，指烏云鷺，何不可言之有！

43 今此句義中，實性、業性眼觸所取者，謂緣知別能有實令實、業令業之性，此即慳重緣取，非各一根所取，故云眼觸所取。又德性是一切根所取，言一切根取者，各一根及眼觸所取。知別有能德令德之性單緣、重緣俱所緣取，故云一切根所取也。餘文准釋實性，文自應審知。問：九實中，地、水、火、風、空之實性，眼觸取，自應知；時、方、我、意之實性，云何應眼觸取耶？答：如上已明，皆是根取，為門取故慳重緣取，九實同一處所故，德性一切根取，亦應准知。

(Kiben 41).

Kogen counters that all these conceptualizations of heavy cognition ( 慳重緣 ) and dual perceptions ( 重緣 ) are fallacious and fabricated by Kiben. The correct interpretation regarding substances should be that the eyes and touch, as interpreted in *dvandva*, can perceive the commonness-particularity of only perceptible substances, namely earth, water, fire, and air. As for the perception of the commonness-particularity of qualities, arguably, there is no dual perception but only perception by all sense organs, in the sense that the commonness-particularity of qualities is perceivable by all five sense organs<sup>44</sup> (Kōgen 9).

**Problem 22** revisits the final topic directly associated with *yānchù*. This discussion commences with the *Daśapadārthī* paragraph, which poses the question of which substances possess the quality of touch. The answer provided is that only earth, water, fire, and air possess this quality, while other substances do not. However, a conundrum arises when Kiben correlates that material substances typically possessed touch, yet the mind, despite being material, is exempt from possessing touch. Consequently, Kiben proposes an interpretation of having “no touch” ( 無 觸 ) as having “no touch of the eyes” ( 無 眼 觸 ), thereby shifting the entire discourse to an epistemological plane, rather than conceding that the mind is ontologically devoid of

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44 批云：一段皆非也。慳重緣、重緣、單緣等語皆是胸臆之私言。於勝宗決無這般名目。誤解一切根取與眼觸取一根取。混其非如有性段駁時方我意之實性是非根取非現量。然誤云「眼觸所取」。此亦如上斥。

touch<sup>45</sup> (Kiben 44-45).

Nonetheless, Kōgen, in a somewhat derisive tone, observes that Kiben had been preoccupied with the concepts of eyes and touch, dedicating considerable effort to contemplating these two characters. As a result, whenever Kiben encounters the word touch, he interpretes it as a combination of the words eyes and touch. This is, according to Kōgen, akin to suffering from jaundice, where everything one sees appears yellow, and touch transforms into eye and touch. Concerning the aspect of materiality and touch, Kōgen advises making a clear distinction between them. Although all touch qualities results in a substance being material, it is not given that materiality necessitates the presence of touch qualities<sup>46</sup> (Kōgen 9).

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45 釋曰：前門之中，以意實有礙攝，今有觸中不攝意實有礙，與觸云何異？答：近來有釋，意雖有礙、有內無外觸，故攝無觸也。今詳曰：此釋不爾。謂：意實形如二微大，所以云有質礙、無有觸義，何故爾耶？答：無觸者，言非眼觸所取，無眼觸故，亦非各一根取，單緣、重緣俱不可得故，以意為無觸也。

46 批云：有人釋為是。今釋甚非也。今此有觸無觸門辨別觸德有無。如次下有色無色門明色德有無，非明眼觸有無。若約眼觸有無四大極微子微亦非現量德。故於四大亦應有有觸無觸分別。若於四大有異門委細分別例如《論》（六紙右）明有實無實有細分無細分等別。彼既爾，此既不爾，唯約觸德有無斷乎可知。釋主舉極微子微雖問難會通，皆是附會之說，不足取耳。且有礙無礙門與有觸無觸門其趣本別。若有觸若無觸極微子微等有形質者皆是有礙，無形質者皆是無礙。若有礙若無礙有觸德者皆是有觸，無之者皆是無觸。有觸實雖皆是有礙非有礙故必有觸有礙有觸義門自別意實有礙而無觸為之故也何物狡兒礙觸混雜舉如是妄難礙觸差別條理分明，誰觸之有？按釋主上來於「眼觸所取」苦心焦慮，大費功夫思慮所礙眼觸二字。遂薰炙目睫，苟見觸字，皆為眼觸二字。譬如患迦摩羅病者，所見皆黃。觸有

#### 4.4 Non-Perceivable Objects (25-27)

Problems belonging to this category are all about Vaiśeṣika entities that, according to Kiben's understanding, are non-perceivable. **Issue 25** deals with two types of non-perceivable objects. This problem has its origins in the passage from *Daśapadārthī*, where it is asked: how many among the 24 Vaiśeṣika qualities are perceived and not perceived? Kiben comments that there are qualities perceived by the sense organs, such as color, taste, smell, touch, and sound, and there are also qualities perceived by the self, such as cognition, pleasure, pain, etc.

However, what is unusual is that after explaining the two types of perceivable objects, Kiben proceeds to comment about two types of non-perceivables. He distinguishes non-perceivable objects that belong to sense organ perception (根取為門非現境) and non-perceivable objects that belong to self-perception (我所取非現境). The latter type is also called perception non-dependent on sense organs (非依根取). The specific instances of non-perceivable objects of the first type are atoms, first-level atomic compounds, their qualities, as well as objects that are known through inference based on inferential marks known through sense organs. However, Kiben provides no concrete examples of entities of the second type<sup>47</sup> (Kiben 49).

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觸為眼觸所取。職是之由。今余一針庶幾乎治其病源。

<sup>47</sup> 非現境亦二：一、根取為門非現境，謂在極微、子微色等德，比量境待根取境及相所相，相違智念，我、意合取境，云根取非現境；二、我所取非現境，謂非依根取，但我、意合起非現智取境，云我取非現境。

Kōgen objects to the whole idea of non-perceivable objects because the notion of sense organs already implies perception; there is no room for non-perception, let alone non-perceivable objects ( 根取必現量，無非現義 ). With regard to non-perceivables by the self, similar logic applies. Kōgen points out that likening the latter type with perception non-dependent on sense organs is contradictory because non-perception is simply not the same as perception non-dependent on sense organs. That is to say, perception by the self leads to perception anyway and not to non-perceivable objects<sup>48</sup> (Kōgen 10). A possible influence on Kiben's classification of non-perceivables within the spheres of perception, which for Kogen would constitute a non-existent category of objects, could have come from Kiben's own school of Consciousness-Only, where non-existent objects are discussed as a category that can be perceived by the mind. (Yao 47-64).

**Problem 26** discusses the perceptibility of primary atomic compounds by combining two different perspectives from two separate Vaiśeṣika schools (the root 本部 and branch schools 末部 ). According to the Vaiśeṣika understanding, earth, water, fire, air, and mind are substances that have an atomic form. Earth, water, fire, and air atoms can also combine together to create larger atomic compounds. In other words, as per the Vaiśeṣika

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<sup>48</sup> 立根取非現者，亦是臆說，不可從矣。勝宗計，根取必現量，無非現義。何者，根若不與我意合，則無取境用。苟與我意合，必取現境約智言之四三和合生現智約境言之一根取眼觸所取一切根取現境，故根取名唯依現量而樹焉。比量唯我意二和合，無合根取義。豈比量有根取義哉。然非根取（我意名）與非現量相望亦有寬狹。非現量必非根取非現皆非合根取。故非根取（我意名）不必非現量。

explanation in *Daśapadārthī*, pairs of atoms produce a child atom ( $1+1=3$ ). Later, three such atoms combine with another three atoms to create the seventh atom ( $3+3=7$ ). In turn, seven atoms combined with another seven atoms produce the fifteenth child atom ( $7+7=15$ ). In this way, the phenomenal world is created.

In existing Sanskrit sources, the orthodox scheme suggested by Praśastapāda and explained by his commentators is that two atoms (*aṇu*) make up a compound, *dvyānuka* ( $1+1=2$ ), and three *dvyānukas* ( $2+2+2=6$ ) make up *tryaṇuka*, which consists of six atoms (Bronkhorst 27-31). Here, I would like to note the distinctive Chinese interpretation of atomic aggregation that invokes the biological family model by naming two atoms as father and mother and the result of the pairing as the child. The subsequent aggregates function as families, and the newly-born individual is not more than its family; for example, the seventh atom is nothing but equal to the two families of  $3+3$ .

Returning to the problem, it deals with one particular disagreement regarding the perception of primary atomic compounds, also known as child atoms. According to *Daśapadārthī*, atoms and their primary compounds (the child atoms) are non-perceptible (極微及二極微果，名非現境). However, Kiben points out another reading from Kuījī, where it is said that primary atomic compounds or the child atoms and above are perceivable (子微上現量所得). So, who is right? According to Kiben, the best way to understand Kuījī's interpretation is that his position represents an older layer of Vaiśeṣika, the root school (本部), where primary atomic compounds can be perceived. Meanwhile, *Daśapadārthī* represents the branch school (末部)

where primary compounds are unperceived<sup>49</sup> (Kiben 50).

Kōgen additionally notes that Kiben is too reliant on Kuījī's interpretation by listing it in his commentary because Kuījī clearly confuses the root and branch schools. Namely, *Chéng Wéishí Lùn* attempts to refute Vaiśeṣika based on the six *padārthas* theory; however, many explanations are based on *Daśapadārth*<sup>50</sup> (Kōgen 10-11).

**Problem 27** addresses a question that arises in Kiben's commentary, specifically whether the qualities of omnipresent and non-material substances, such as ether, time, space, and the self, are perceivable or non-perceivable. Kiben responds to the question with the unusual logic of non-perceivables that are associated with a particular organ of perception. The qualities of ether are said to be non-perceivable but connected to sense organ perception (likely, sound as a quality is not included here), whereas the qualities of space, time, and the self are associated with specific organs, such as the touch of the eyes, as non-perceivable objects<sup>51</sup> (Kiben 51). Kōgen maintains his previous

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49 又近世有人由「十句論」文斥「基疏」釋，是亦不辨勝宗本末計別，不可依用。二、述今義者，由「基疏」說「成唯識論」舉勝宗計由根本六句說，今此論勝宗末部論，所以彼此自成相違。

50 唯識論舉勝宗計由根本六句說故爾。然基疏將釋論文，先設玄談，全由末部十句法相列名出體五門分別廣明勝宗深旨。彼第三（五門中）現量比量門中證破順世及勝論唯識論文成子微現量義。此即引根本證末部。《基疏》卻似混本末。有人評釋何可謂妄哉。釋主會通恐難成立。且釋主引證論文與《基疏》所引語異意同，此唯依樣畫葫蘆耳。《基疏》引彼證此故有人評析之所以由起也。釋主闔思？雖然，有人亦偏執末部為本部亦子微現量，則均是本末混亂之過也。

51 問：空、時、方、我上極大及別體等為現、將非現歟？答：於空實，

understanding that the entire notion of non-perceivables as belonging to some type of perception or sense organs is simply absurd<sup>52</sup> (Kōgen 11).

#### 4.5 Other Perception-related Issues (11-13, 30-31)

The issues within this category address various perception-related matters. Issues 11-13 focus on aspects of perception that pertain to the definition of commonness (*sāmānya* 同) and commonness-particularity (*sāmānya-viśeṣa* 俱分).

**Problem 11** is based on a passage from *Daśapadārthī*, which defines commonness as “being that is inherent in all *padārthas* of substance, quality, and action, and perceived by all sense organs” etc.<sup>53</sup> (Maticandra 36). The origin of the problem lies in the term “perceived by all sense organs” (一切根所取). Kiben comments that the perception by all sense organs refers to the perception of being by each individual sense organ, as well as by the eyes and touch<sup>54</sup> (Kiben 36).

However, the situation is complicated by the fact that, according to Vaiśeṣika, there exist substance atoms with qualities and actions that are imperceptible. Moreover, certain substances,

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根取非現境；於時、方、我，雖我取非現境，其所有數、量等，眼觸取故，是眼觸為門，非現境。

52 空時方我上數量別體等，皆非根取非現量。然言根取非現若根觸取者，大謬。如上已辨，今不重贅焉。

53 同句義云何？謂：有性。何者為有性？謂：與一切實、德、業句義和合，一切根所取，於實、德、業，有詮智因，是謂有性。

54 一切根所取者，此有性各一根及眼觸所取，故云一切根。謂：此有性在色，眼取而詮智有，乃至在餘餘根取詮智有，故云一切根所取。

such as the self, space, or time, along with their respective qualities, are also imperceptible yet possess being (commonness). Finally, Vaiśeṣika acknowledges the existence of perceivables by the self and mind, such as pain and pleasure, which also possess being. Do the aforementioned objects fail to qualify as existing simply because they are not perceivable by sense organs?

To resolve the apparent problem, Kiben interprets this passage as suggesting that even imperceptibles (非現境) or entities directly perceivable solely by the self and mind belong to the category of sense organs<sup>55</sup> (根取為門; Ibid.). According to Kōgen, however, this interpretation misunderstands the original intention of Maticandra.

Kōgen initially distinguishes two types of perception in Vaiśeṣika: one by sense organs (根取現量) and another by the self (我取現量). Regarding sense organ perception, it is said to be divided into three types: perception by the eyes and touch, by a single sense organ, and by all sense organs. The difference between them is that in perception by eyes and touch, one object is perceivable by two sense organs (一境通眼身二根所取); in perception by a single sense organ, one object is perceivable by only a single sense organ (一境限一根所取); and in perception by all sense organs, one object is perceivable by all five sense organs (一境通五根所取).

Returning to the original problem of the perception of

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<sup>55</sup> 極微、子微實德及有性，雖非現境根取為門，我、意合取；又時、方、我實及德此有性，亦雖非根取，根取為門，我、意合取，故總云有性是一切根所取。

being by all sense organs, Kōgen clarifies that the definition of perception by all sense organs best describes the perception of being because all five sense organs can perceive being (and qualityness). Meanwhile, other objects can be perceived in much more limited ways, such as substances being perceived only by eyes and touch, or sounds being perceived by the ear, etc<sup>56</sup>.

By maintaining this stance, Kōgen firmly rejects any dependence of non-perceivables or perceivables by the self and mind on sense organs. Along the same lines, it is erroneous to assert that the imperceptibles or perceivables by the self and mind do not possess being. The original definition of commonness (being) by Maticandra is only intended to emphasize its unifying nature through exceptional accessibility to sense organ perception (體是一; Kōgen 4-5).

**Problem 12** directly follows problem eleven, addressing Kiben's previous statement regarding why imperceptibles, or things perceived solely by the self and mind, belong to the category of sense organs. Kiben contends that the knowledge of imperceptibles, whether through inference or the perception of inner qualities such as pleasure or pain, depends on external objects that are perceivable by sense organs<sup>57</sup> (Kiben 36-

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56 雖然如是能有有性通實德業，其體是一，故不限二根一根通為五根所取不同俱分句義其多體故實性業性局眼觸所取德性通五根所。

57 現量云樂、苦、欲、瞋、勤勇之有性，是我、意二和合；而其樂、苦二，雖我、意合，現非根取，說云待法、非法，四、三、二和合為因，亦其欲、瞋、勤勇說待色等；既云四、三合亦云待色等，明知根取為門。我、意取之。又比智取非現境，必待現智取現境起，故云見相故，待相所相我、意合，應知根取為門，我、意合取。

37). Kōgen challenges this supposition by offering a pertinent observation.

Although it is true that the formation of pleasure, pain, and certain other mental qualities is related to external objects, the perception of these qualities arises solely through the cognition that emerges from the contact between the self and the mind, without any direct relation to external objects<sup>58</sup> (Kōgen 5). In other words, if pleasure, pain, and other feelings were experienced immediately upon contact with external objects, why would there be a need for them to be perceived by the self and mind? The issue lies in the fact that the original Vaiśeṣika texts do not differentiate between feeling and perceiving; only the term for perception is provided in these texts, leading to two different possible interpretations.

The question remains whether pleasure, pain, and other sensations can exist as feelings not detected by perception or as potential triggers for perception by the self and mind. Kiben seems to assume either of these viewpoints. For Kōgen, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and other emotions are possible only because they are perceived by the self and mind. However, a more balanced perspective would be to combine both of these views to establish a middle ground. Pleasure, pain, and other

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58 其苦樂此我實自性逼悅德與根境合時亦待法非法愛非愛果顯現或逼惱或適悅故四三和合亦為之因雖然苦樂為覺德所取則二和合生我取現量次無有根取為門義覺因門苦樂因門論文自別豈可混乎？其欲嗔希求色等損害色等此其欲嗔行相，何關能所取義？不思之甚！若為覺德所取，則欲嗔亦二和合生我取現境其以勤勇待欲嗔證者待覺沒交涉欲嗔希求色等猶非根取為門證況待心法欲嗔乎可謂心取為門之證也。

sensations exist both due to external object stimuli and as a result of the interaction between the self and mind.

**Problem 13** examines the *padārtha* of commonness-particularity (*sāmānya-viśeṣa* 俱分), specifically focusing on its plural nature (體是多), which sets it apart from the unifying nature of being (體是一). For example, in contrast to being, which is common to all substances, qualities, and actions, the commonness-particularity of quality differ from the commonness-particularity of substance, and so on. Kōgen expresses dissatisfaction with Kiben's commentary, contending that it does not sufficiently clarify the distinctions between being and commonness-particularity *padārthas*<sup>59</sup> (Kōgen 5-6). *Daśapadārthī* defines commonness-particularity as follows: "Substanceness, qualityness, and actionness, along with aspects such as earthiness, colorness, upward-movementness, and so forth, which are inherent in the same entity as the former ones [are inherent in], are termed the *padārtha* of commonness-particular"

The primary distinction lies in the commonness-particularity of earth, water, fire, and arguably air substances, as well as numerous actions, unlike qualities, which can only be perceived through the eyes and touch (referred to as 眼觸所取). It is crucial to recognize that certain commonness-particularities may

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59 俱分句義實德業性各各差別其體是多；不同有性通實德業其體是一。故就根取門明其差別實性則眼觸所取。勝宗意許實句中地水火風是眼身二根所取故彼性俱分亦彼二根所取故云眼觸所取。眼謂眼根。觸謂身根。隨境立名。猶如舌根稱味根。四和合中地水火風俱分。此其實性眼觸所取。德性即一切根所取。

not be perceptible due to being inherent in objects that are either too small or too large (e.g., atoms or space, time, etc.). However, these commonness-particularities should not be reduced to dependence on sense organs, as Kiben suggests in the case of commonness.

**Problem 30** addresses the section on the perception of qualities by sense organs in the *Daśapadārthī*. It is stated that “sound, touch, color, taste, and smell are each perceived by one sense organ. Number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, posteriority, priority, weight, fluidity, moisture, and velocity are perceived by the eyes and skin” (Maticandra 55). Kiben clarifies that the perception of qualities by the self is excluded, as the section focuses on sense organ perception (Kiben 55). In his subcommentary, Kōgen addresses two questions that could arise concerning the perception of qualities.

The first question is why qualities such as number, dimension, and others perceivable by the eyes and skin cannot be perceived by the nose and tongue. The answer given is that only color and touch possess or reveal qualities like dimension, etc. In other words, smell and taste are not capable of providing any more information about other qualities than themselves.<sup>60</sup>

The second question that arises is how ether, being

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60 問：就數量等眼觸所取狐疑未決。何者地水火風如次鼻舌眼皮四根。然四大各有數量等，何故眼皮所取非鼻舌二根所取？答：鼻取香。香唯有薰蕕氣，無長短等氣。舌取味。味唯有辛甘苦淡等味，無長短等味。故鼻舌雖有數量等，而不能自取眼取色及取觸。色、觸二境具長短等故眼皮各取數量等，請勿狐疑。

immaterial, can provide the basis for the perception of sound. The logic behind this question is that non-material substances and their qualities are typically imperceptible, so why is sound an exception? The response is that it is natural for the five sense organs to have corresponding qualities for perception, which are located in substances. Thus, although ether is distinct from other substances due to its non-material nature (無礙), sound can still be perceived within it<sup>61</sup> (Kōgen 11-12).

**Problem 31** addresses specific discrepancies in interpretation that arise from Kuījī's (窺基) reading of the *Daśapadārthī* section concerning perception derived from the four conjunctions<sup>62</sup> (四和合生現量; Maticandra 60). According to Kōgen, the situation is more intricate than what the *Daśapadārthī* and the commentaries of Kuījī or Kiben present.

As previously discussed in relation to other problems, being, commonness-particularity, qualities, actions, and even potentiality and non-potentiality *padārthas* may be perceived by the sense organs if they inhere in substances (excluding the self and ether) accessible to sensory perception. However, Kuījī's

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61 問：依有礙實德依極微猶非根取非現量故，依無礙實數量等定是非根取者，空實所有聲何故一切根取現境？答：五根於五塵是自然現量。雖佛教所說，亦無異轍。何容疑於斯？然於所依實四大有礙有粗細別，故色味香觸有現非現異。空無礙遍行無粗細別，故聲一切現量空實所有數量等無依孫微上理故唯我意合取非根取非現境。請勿猶豫。

62 The four conjunctions refer to the relationship in which the self, mind, sense organs, and external objects interact to produce perception. In the case of sound as a percept, only three conjunctions—those between the self, mind, and the sense organ of the ears—are involved. Finally, the two conjunctions between the self and mind can result in the perception of mental qualities.

commentary implies that actions, being, and commonness-particularity are perceivable by default. A similar implication can be drawn from reading only the *Daśapadārthī*. Kōgen contends that Kuījī's perspective is one-sided, and any being, commonness-particularity, or action beyond the four, three or two conjunctions of perception ( 四三二和合 ) is imperceptible<sup>63</sup> (Kōgen 12).

Kōgen identifies a second questionable assertion by Kuījī, namely that *padārthas* of potentiality and non-potentiality are imperceptible. However, the *Daśapadārthī* clearly states that they are perceptible when inherent in perceivable objects. Kōgen attributes such mistakes to Kuījī's bold character and his lack of deep immersion in the intricate aspects of the doctrine ( 豪邁之資，不潛心於瑣瑣義門 ). Kiben also receives criticism for not addressing Kuījī's incorrect assumptions<sup>64</sup> (Ibid. 12-13).

#### 4.6 Misinterpretation of the Vaiśeṣika Notion of Mind (10, 24)

Problems 10 and 24 address questions regarding the Vaiśeṣika concept of mind (*manas* 意 ). **Problem 10** initiates with Kiben's

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63 問：若大有同異業亦通非現者，何故《述記》一末（四十八紙左）言其業有性並俱分皆現量得？答：基釋實不審。然由引諸根得論說以證其義觀之，此唯依根取現量一邊判者耶？若不爾，雖基師乎難復適從。彼四三二和合外有性俱分業句決定非根取非現法故。

64 問：何故《述記》一末（四十九左）言有能無能雖無文辨並非現得？答：今四三二和合現境中皆出有能無能，論文昭灼。基師雖以因之所須成非現量義，現違論說，其義何立？〔……〕竊按基師豪邁之資，不潛心於瑣瑣義門，故有一時偶然之失乎？〔……〕釋主於業句雖簡現比，於有性俱分有能無能，漫然闕釋。且於基疏無一語評者何也？彼其不達根取義門，欲進立論說，忽違基疏。

commentary on a passage from *Daśapadārthī*, where the mind is referenced. Kiben describes the mind as possessing the capabilities of “cogitative condition” and movement (能緣慮有動作) (Kiben 29). The term “cogitative condition” (緣慮) is employed by Buddhists to denote the mind’s capacity to recognize a specific object. Although movement is indeed a characteristic of the Vaiśeṣika mind, the mind is not considered mental in the sense of exhibiting cognitions. The mind is merely a non-inherent cause that, in conjunction with the self, engenders cognitions that are qualities. Consequently, Kōgen promptly highlights that, according to Vaiśeṣikas, the mind is material and bears no resemblance to the Buddhist understanding of the mind, which is of a mental nature. Kōgen also notes that Kuūjī, while refuting Vaiśeṣika in *Chéng Wéishí Lùn Shùjì*, was fully cognizant of this and characterized the mind as material (or possessing obstructive properties), being of the size of a mustard seed (extremely small), and owned by the self<sup>65</sup> (Kōgen 4).

**Issue 24** continues the discussion of the mind from another perspective, specifically its unconventional size among Vaiśeṣika *padārthas*. The *Daśapadārthī* describes the mind as eternal, but its size remains ambiguously defined: to be eternal, it must either be omnipresent or of the smallest atomic size. In one passage, its dimension (量) is implied as roundness<sup>66</sup> (圓), while in another, it is not listed among substances that possess roundness. Kiben, in his commentary, appears to be uncertain about the validity of

<sup>65</sup> 意實是有礙攝。亦非是心。形如芥子。我所須具。非謂心也。

<sup>66</sup> Roundness implies either the smallest or the largest size.

roundness as well<sup>67</sup> (Kiben 46).

The Indian Vaiśeṣika tradition, beginning with the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, asserts that the mind is of the smallest size (sūtra 7.1.30; *aṇu manah*) (Kaṇāda 202). Kuījī, in his commentary on *Chéng Wéishí Lùn*, mentions that the mind is the size of a mustard seed, and his commentator Huìzhǎo (惠沼) provides an exact estimate of the mind as consisting of two atoms (二微大). This estimate is reiterated by Kiben (Kiben 13, 44-45, 49). However, a size of two atoms cannot render the mind eternal, which would contradict the *Daśapadārthī* text. Regardless, Kōgen does not challenge this assumption; his primary focus is on the concept of roundness (圓), which, according to him, should not apply to the mind<sup>68</sup> (Kōgen 9-10).

#### 4.7 Misquotation, Misinterpretation, Conflation, or Omission of Specific Vaiśeṣika Concepts (1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 28, 35)

**Problems 1 and 8** are similar, as they both involve non-existent quotations from the *Abhidharmakośa*, which Kiben claims to be citing. In the first instance, Kiben purports to quote from an older version of the *Abhidharmakośa* regarding Vaiśeṣika substances. However, Kōgen conducts some research and discovers that the quotation actually originates from the

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67 謂地等四極微者，空、時、方、我、意此五常者〔……〕無細分者，謂父母地等、空時等五，是常住圓德故，云無細分。意實雖非圓德，亦無觸故，為無細分〔……〕圓、不圓者，極微四實及空等五，圓體德故，名圓；子微上不爾故，云不圓。

68 意實如子微大故非極微有質礙非通行，故亦非極大意實非圓德〔……〕言量謂微體說如二微大。故不言意實有極微圓德。

*Bāi Lùn Shū* (百論疏), leading him to characterize Kiben as a superficial learner (可謂膚受之學). The second case mirrors the first, with a supposed quotation about a list of Vaiśeṣika qualities from the *Abhidharmakośa*, which again is traced back to the *Bāi Lùn Shū*<sup>69</sup> (Ibid. 1, 3). It's worth noting that Kōgen was an expert in the *Abhidharmakośa*, and thus had intimate knowledge of its original text.

**Problem 2** revolves around a flawed interpretation of the character *děng* (等) in the Vaiśeṣika definition of the self. In the *Daśapadārthī*, the self is defined as the inherent cause of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, internal effort, *dharma*, *adharmā*, and *děng* (等), with cognition as its characteristic feature<sup>70</sup> (Maticandra 8). Kiben proposes six possible interpretations of what *děng* could signify. Kōgen specifically critiques the sixth explanation, which posits that *děng* means “equally” (同也、均也), implying that the self is the equal inherent cause for all nine qualities<sup>71</sup> (Kiben 9).

69 《百論疏》上、中（二十七紙）言《俱舍論》云引用此文。今檢舊《俱舍》一部始終無有此文。《新論》亦爾。按《俱舍》中雖有乘義便間破斥勝論計而如是縷說，無理可有。決是疏主暗記之差。釋主單信嘉祥（吉藏）言，妄加舊一字，可謂膚受之學也〔……〕批云：此亦《百論疏》上、中（二十七紙右）所引論文。然《俱舍》無文。「舊」一字亦釋主妄加。如上已述。

70 我云何？謂：是覺、樂、苦、欲、瞋、勤勇、行、法、非法等和合因緣，起智為相，是為我。

71 今設一解云：等言非向內亦非向外，等言冠次句和合因緣上。等者，同也、均也，彰和合義，彰我為九德等均為和合因緣之義也。次意實下，不和合因緣上，不云等言，覺等九是我實，德無等均和合義故但云不和，不云等也。

Contrarily, the Vaiśeṣika definition of the mind is nearly identical, except for the absence of the character *dēṅ*, and the mind is described as a non-inherent cause for the nine qualities. Regarding the non-existence of the *dēṅ* character in the definition of the mind, Kiben suggests that a non-inherent cause conveys a similar idea of not being an equal cause. However, Kōgen astutely observes that this explanation falls short. If *dēṅ* truly meant “equally” it could have been used in the definition of the mind, as the mind could be equally described as a non-inherent cause<sup>72</sup> (均等不和合義) (Kōgen 1). Regardless, neither Kiben nor Kōgen consider what might be the most plausible interpretation: that *dēṅ* is a superfluous character wrongly added to the text.

**Problem 7** addresses the conflation of substance atoms with the quality of dimension, specifically, smallness. In one passage, Kiben poses the question: why is it stated that the quality, which is explained to be of small dimension, is produced by the inherent cause of two entities? Kiben responds by asserting that these two entities are referred to as the father and mother of smallness (atoms), which is the *padārtha* of quality<sup>73</sup> (Kiben 12).

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72 今此一解，等為均等、同等義，冠次句上。雖有一理，恐非確論。若我實為覺等均等，為和合因緣，故等言冠和合因緣上則意實為覺等均等，為不和合因緣，故亦應不和合因緣上有等言意實既均等不和合，而無等言，卻足證我實等言非均等義。和合、不和合雖異，均等義同。故釋主唯知意實於覺等無均等和合義，不知有均等不和合義。

73 問：若爾，德句義中，明量微體云為和合因緣二體所生耶？答：二體所生者，所謂父母二微。是德句故，雖立無德、常住、實有，故與二微果和合之時，為所依託，故云和合因緣二體也。

While this sentence could be interpreted as Kiben understanding the distinction between substance atoms and qualities, Kōgen contends that Kiben conflates the meanings of smallness, which is the quality inherent to extremely small substance compounds<sup>74</sup> (Kōgen 3).

**Problem 9** explores a closely related issue, specifically, the ambiguous usage of the term *jīwēi* (極微). This term can denote both an atom and the smallest measure (量), a quality inherent to atoms. According to Kiben, in the definition of *jīwēi*<sup>75</sup> as a quality in *Daśapadārthī* (Maticandra 22), *jīwēi* is employed to refer to non-inhering father and mother atoms that possess *jīwēi* as a quality<sup>76</sup> (極微，謂不和合父母，真實極微上有) (Kiben 22). However, Kōgen opposes this interpretation and suggests that *suōyōu* (所有) in the definition could be read as *zhūyōu* (諸有), which could imply that *jīwēi* in the definition is used solely as a quality<sup>77</sup> (Kōgen 3).

**Problem 28** addresses the omission of a character representing

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<sup>74</sup> 批云：此一問答實德混雜，大害宗意，不可不辨〔……〕然釋主見量德下有二體所生一實等言，誤以為極微等即是其量德遂設無益問答作牽合附會之說。云二體所生者所謂父母二微是德句故雖立無德常住實有等。此錯解文句，違害宗意，是可忍也，孰不可忍也？錯解文句者，所謂二體所生者其體即實句然誤以為德且二體者謂極微則所生謂子微然通漫言二體所生者所謂父母二微，豈不錯解哉！

<sup>75</sup> 極微所有和合，一實，極微詮緣因，是名極微。

<sup>76</sup> 極微，謂不和合父母真實極微上有，所有和合一實者所有，謂極微。是德句故，必為實所有，故云極微所有。極微即所有，持業釋也。所有是極微，則能有是誰？謂地、水、火、風實。

<sup>77</sup> 批云：極微為德句及為實所有。此亦不爾。如上委辨。今云所有者，猶言諸有。非能有所有之謂也。

inferential knowledge (比). In outlining the conditions for the emergence of *dharma*, *adharmā*, and *saṃskāra* qualities, Kiben points out that factors such as adherence to scriptures (聞念) and distancing oneself from impurities (遠離) are relevant, along with perceptual knowledge<sup>78</sup> (Kiben 51). Kōgen supplements this argument by emphasizing that inferential cognition is of equal importance and should be incorporated, referencing the section on *saṃskāra* (念因) where inferential knowledge is included<sup>79</sup> (Kōgen 11).

**Problem 35** pertains to a mischaracterization of the Vaiśeṣika relationship between quality and materiality (質礙). Kiben asserts that the five types of action in Vaiśeṣika, despite their dependence on material substances, are themselves markers devoid of qualities, and that which lacks qualities lacks materiality (是標幟故無德、無德故無礙) (Kiben 68). Kōgen contests this latter statement, as it could erroneously suggest that anything possessing qualities is material. This contradicts the Vaiśeṣika recognition of substances such as ether, space, time, and the self, which, despite being immaterial, undoubtedly possess qualities<sup>80</sup> (Kōgen 14).

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<sup>78</sup> 法、非法、行，亦雖我、意合，起智境必待聞念遠離及現智念等，屬起智故，云非現境。

<sup>79</sup> 批云：應言「現、比智」。何除「比」字乎？念因作待現、比二智起。如論（三紙左）、同（九紙左）明可見。若唯待現智念因作是非現量，則待比智念因卻為現量耶。

<sup>80</sup> 此亦不是。應言無質礙等者雖依有礙實其體非極微子微等，故無質礙，非德親所依。故無德。若如釋主言，無德故無礙，則有德故應有礙。若爾，空時方我亦有德，故為有質礙乎？妄說可知。

#### 4.8 Other Misinterpretations of Vaiśeṣika Doctrines (23, 29, 33)

**Problem 23** is about a minor fallacy in the classification of eternal and non-eternal substances. Kiben classifies 9 substances as either eternal or non-eternal (九實常無常門). Next, earth, water, fire, and air substances are further distinguished as eternal in their atomic forms, and non-eternal in their product forms (地、水、火、風常無常). These are two-level characterizations of substances<sup>81</sup> (Kiben 45). Kōgen objects to Kiben and offers a slightly alternative classification scheme to accord with the *Daśapadārthī* text. First, he mentions nine substances among which five are eternal and four, namely, earth, water, fire, and air that have a further subdivision (九實五常四分別). The second classification elucidates the latter subdivision as four substances of earth, water, fire, and air that are eternal and non-eternal<sup>82</sup> (四大常無常) (Kōgen 9). Although the second classification seemingly overlaps in both Kiben and Kōgen, the first classification of Kōgen captures Vaiśeṣika substances better by firstly distinguishing five substances that have intrinsic eternality, and later four that are both eternal and non-eternal.

**Problem 29** addresses the question of a disjunction (*vibhāga*

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81 五、常無常門，文段有三：初、九實常無常門，二、地、水、火、風常無常門，三、例同餘。

82 批云：釋主不善解論文。混大科細科，故甚害論意。今改科云：常無常門大為二段。初、九實常無常門，論云如是九實五常四分別。後四大常無常門於中亦二：初、正四大常無常。論云謂此四中非所造者常所造者無常後四大餘門例明論云如常無常乃至不圓亦爾。

離 ) causing a conjunction (*samyoga* 合). Conjunction and disjunction are two closely related Vaiśeṣika qualities that play a role in the production of action, especially physical actions. When two or more substances come or part by conjunction and disjunction, an action is produced. Equally, actions in turn produce conjunctions or disjunctions of substances, as a moving substance comes into contact or parts with substances surrounding it. However, nowhere is it specified that conjunction and disjunction can produce conjunction. This is what Kiben claims (合離生合) (Kiben 54). Kōgen disproves Kiben’s mistake by pointing to the fact that neither conjunction produces disjunction, nor can disjunction produce conjunction, etc.<sup>83</sup> (Kōgen 11).

**Problem 33** refers to the misinterpretation of life activity (*jīvana* 命緣) as a sense organ. When describing the causes of the quality of internal effort (*prayatna* 勤勇), *Daśapadārthī* defines a type of internal effort related to seemingly effortless actions such as inhaling and exhaling breath, etc. The cause of this type of internal effort is called life activity (Maticandra 61). Kiben interestingly glosses the term “life activity” as a sense organ (命根) (Kiben 61).

Kōgen has three main complaints about Kiben’s explanation. The first one is that Kiben is going too far in interpreting life

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<sup>83</sup> 批云：離生合語恐不允當。合、離二德雖各有三種，合皆是二不至至時名。合離皆是二全不至時名離。故無有離生合、合生離。是以論（二紙）明合離德，言合生合、離生離，不言離生合、合生離。又論（八紙左）合說合離因，言隨一業俱業合離為因。所言合離者，合即合生合因，離即離生離因。如釋主自解（釋下廿七紙右）。然釋主翻對合生合，以一業生、俱業生合為離生合耶？

activity as a sense organ in the system of Vaiśeṣika. The second objection relates to an example given by Kiben. He uses a dubious example of a meditative absorption (即平等心禪定), while the original example from Vaiśeṣika is a person sleeping. Finally, Kōgen argues that Kiben's text could be misconstrued to suggest that inhalation and exhalation, together with life activity, are the causes of internal effort (勇以命根及入出息為因), but in reality, the situation is the opposite<sup>84</sup> (Kōgen 13).

## 5. Conclusions

Kōgen criticizes Kiben by identifying 37 problems in his understanding of *Daśapadārthī* or Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Some of these issues, such as unsupported quotations from the *Abhidharmakośa* (1, 8), the omission of a character for inferential knowledge (比, 28), or misinterpretations of certain Vaiśeṣika concepts (23, 29, 34, 35), though seemingly minor, reveal Kiben's oversight and highlight Kōgen's keen attention to detail, illustrating that true comprehension lies in the smallest details. On the other hand, an issue like number 33, where a "life faculty" (命根) is attributed to Vaiśeṣika by Kiben, could be read as an undesirable Buddhist influence on the interpretation of Vaiśeṣika.

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<sup>84</sup> 應知勝宗計根唯五根，不立命根。然釋主解命緣為命根，此其妄釋之一也。言不欲故對照下文是睡者身業不欲。然解言不欲勤勇即平等心禪定等，此其妄釋之二也。出入息業命緣為因勤勇為不和合。因業是果，勤勇是因。此即依勤勇策勵發作業。譬如佛家立由思心所造作發身口業。釋主亦下（四十一紙左）釋曰：無策勵則不發業。然今不欲勤勇以出入息為因，豈不因果顛倒哉？果爾，可言由業發勤勇策勵及由身口意發思心所乎？使人葫蘆絕倒，此其妄釋之三也。

However, here, Kiben might only be glossing a less familiar term for a potential Buddhist reader, without committing to the importance of his chosen term.

Problems 7 and 9, although seemingly trivial at first glance, might indicate an issue arising from language both in Sanskrit and Chinese. Sanskrit *aṇu* or Chinese *wēi* (微) can denote both “smallness” as a quality and a “small object” as a substance. For Buddhists, who do not clearly differentiate between substance and its properties in their theory, this could result in a conflation. Problem 2, where much ink is spilled over the interpretation of just one character *děng* (等), is perhaps one of the most significant scribal errors left in the original Chinese *Daśapadārthī*.

With regard to the group of errors concerning inherent and non-inherent causes (3, 4, 6, 34, 36-37), they likely caused misunderstandings in the time of Kiben and Kōgen. This is because even in the early Vaiśeṣika texts, inherence is not explicitly described, and its specificities are closely related to the nuances of substance and other *padārthas* which are inherent in substance. The difficulty of inherence (3) is suggested by Kōgen to be solved with the original Chinese terms for proximate (親所依) and remote support (疏所依). Some of Kiben’s errors on inherence are blatantly clear (4, 6, 37), while others remain more opaque (36).

Problems related to touch and the perceptibility of air (5, 32) are intriguing, as Kōgen seems to advocate a novel idea, marginally represented in Indian Vaiśeṣika, that air substance is perceivable by the sense organs. This idea is further supported in

the largest section of problems related to the concept of *yǎnchù* (眼觸) (14-22). Here, Kōgen advocates for reading *yǎnchù* as “eyes and touch”, giving touch equal importance in perception as the eyes. Conversely, Kiben, in reading *yǎnchù* as “the touch of the eyes,” appears influenced by Buddhist philosophy, in which touch functions as a mental factor that enables sense organs (here, eyes) to come into contact with objects for perception.

Problems 25 and 27 relate to non-perceivable objects that are nonetheless within the sphere of perception, a discourse contrary to Vaiśeṣika that Kiben might have adopted from his association with the consciousness-only school. Problem 26 exposes two divergent views on the perception of atomic compounds, an older view where the primary compounds are perceived and a modern one, where they are not. Problems 11-13 diverge from the section of perception-related issues because Kiben aims to advocate a contentious idea that non-perceivable objects or perceivables by the self and mind depend on the sense organs. In problem 31, similar to 26, Kōgen challenges the authority of Kuījī, a master whose opinion on Vaiśeṣika had largely been undisputed in the past. Lastly, discussions about the Vaiśeṣika notion of mind (10, 24) may prompt readers to reflect on the uniqueness of the Vaiśeṣika mind, which is considered material, contrasting with the mental nature of the Buddhist mind. Moreover, the conversation between Kiben and Kōgen reveals that the Vaiśeṣika mind, in contrast to Indian Vaiśeṣika, was conceived as an atomic compound and not as a primary atom.

The study of these two commentaries reveals a complex picture of Vaiśeṣika reception in East Asia. It demonstrates how

philosophical ideas can be transmitted and reinterpreted across cultures, highlighting the challenges of studying philosophical texts from different historical and intellectual contexts. The main difference between Kiben's and Kōgen's commentaries lies in Kiben's occasionally more creative and far-fetched interpretive approach, while Kōgen takes a more orthodox stance, closer to the original Vaiśeṣika interpretations. Kiben's commentary, despite its flaws, played a crucial role in disseminating Vaiśeṣika thought during the Edo period. Kōgen's sub-commentary, however, represents a more nuanced engagement with Vaiśeṣika, demonstrating a deeper understanding of the philosophy. This suggests that the reception of Vaiśeṣika in East Asia varied, ranging from its misinterpretation and integration into existing Buddhist frameworks to a critical analysis of the philosophy's internal logic and terms. It is hoped that this work is just a first step in researching the reception of Vaiśeṣika, and that future scholars will further explore the reasons behind not only Kiben's and Kogen's interpretive disagreements but also Vaiśeṣika interpretations in the Edo period more broadly.

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# 東亞對勝論哲學的接納研究：以光嚴乘體（1740-1807）的《勝宗十句義論釋傍觀錄》為中心探討

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## 摘要

本篇論文探討東亞對 Vaiśeṣika（勝論）哲學的接納情況，主要分析光嚴乘體尚未研究過的 Vaiśeṣika 注釋《勝宗十句義論釋傍觀錄》。這篇注釋對基辨大同房（1718-1791）針對東亞 Vaiśeṣika 哲學的關鍵文本《勝宗十句義論》的注釋《勝宗十句義論釋》提供了一種既深思熟慮又高度批判的解讀。光嚴乘體的注釋圍繞三十七個獨特的問題，所有這些問題都源於基辨對 Vaiśeṣika 有爭議的解讀。本論文對每一個問題進行分析、描述和脈絡定位。這些問題涵蓋了各種哲學概念，從本體論和知覺到解釋 Vaiśeṣika 專業詞彙，以及如誤引、遺漏或混淆 Vaiśeṣika 詞彙的錯誤。

## 關鍵詞

勝論、勝宗十句義論、光嚴乘體、基辨大同房、江戶時代